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A GENERALIZATION OF OWICKI-GRIES’S HOARE LOGIC 
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Abstract. A syntax-directed generalization of Owicki-Gries’s Hoare logic for a parallel while 
language is presented. The rules are based on Hoare asserted programs of the form {r, A} p {B, A} 
where f, A are sets of first-order formulas. These triples are interpreted with respect to an 
operational semantics involving potential computations where r, A are sets of invariants. 
Introduction 
Consider the pair of Hoare logic rules: 
{Al P {Bl {Bl q {Cl 
; 
if {AADIP{BI {A A lD1 q {Bl 
{Al p;q {Cl {A} if D thenp else q {I?} 
Understanding (and applying) these rules is independent of knowing the program 
structure of p and q in the premises, and similarly for the logical structure of the 
formulas in the sequential composition rule. But some knowledge of logical structure 
is needed in the if rule: the two preconditions must be of the form A A D, A A TD 
although no knowledge of the structures of A and D is necessary. 
Well known is the difficulty in maintaining the virtues of the above rules in the 
case of a Hoare rule for the parallel combinator 1) (assumed, here, to be binary). 
We would then expect such a proof rule to have the form 
{A1 P {W {Clq{Dl 
U-CA, C)lplls MB, D)l 
whereJ; g are uniform logical operators, possibly dependent on the logical structure 
of their arguments (which we may insist to be of a definite form). Unfortunately, 
the following kind of example undermines any interesting version of this rule. Let 
p,, for each n > 0 and q be the programs 
p,, =x:=0 ifx>O then x:=n else x:=0, 
q=x:=1 ; x:=0. 
For each n, {tt} p,, {x = O} and {tt} q {x = 0} hold where tt is true. Iff(tt, tt) is defined, 
then it could hardly be other than equivalent to tt. But, for each n, {tt} pn 11 q {x = 0 v 
x = n}. Assume that x ranges over the natural numbers. Then we are forced to 
conclude that if g(x=O, x = 0) is defined, then it also has to be equivalent to tt 
(since, for each n, g(x=O,x=O)+x=Ovx=n). 
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A Hoare asserted program {A} p {B} carries insufficient information in the pres- 
ence of 11. There are two interwoven deficiencies. On the one hand, the meaning of 
{A} p {B} tells us little about the properties of the intermediate states an execution 
of p may pass through when A is initially true. On the other hand, the usual meanings 
of p do not include the possible effects of interference. For instance, the meaning 
of P,, above (either as an input/output function or as a family of histories, of 
sequences of states), does not include the possibility that x:=n may be executed. 
Owicki-Cries overcome the first shortcoming by appealing to proof outlines [9, lo]: 
a Hoare triple should not be viewed as an independent object but as the result of 
a proof outline which carries information about the intermediate states. Then the 
second deficiency is dealt with using interference freedom of proof outlines: two 
outlines are interference-free if the preconditions and final postcondition in either 
are “invariants” relative to the subproofs of the indivisible subprograms of the other. 
Other ways of logically coding the additional information have been proposed. 
One idea is to explicitly invoke a more expressive first-order language than normally 
countenanced in Hoare logics for sequential while programs by including history 
variables ranging over sequences of values of shared variables [II]. This not only 
increases the amount of detail needed for a specification of a parallel program, but 
it also depends on a (nonlogical) notion of compatibility of histories for the parallel 
rule. Alternatively, one can try to abstract from such detail by appealing to various 
notions of invariant. One version is to reinterpret the Hoare triple {A} p {B} making 
A an invariant [7]. Another is to include noninterference conditions as invariants 
in the specification [6]. But there is also the unfortunate need to weaken the role 
of invariants by appealing to auxiliary variables or spatial predicates ranging over 
program places. These are by no means the only proposals [4]. 
Starting from the second deficiency we reformulate and generalize Owicki-Gries’s 
Hoare logic as a system of syntax-directed rules. Like the original system it has the 
drawback of depending on auxiliary variables. Following [l, 31 we interpret a 
program in terms of its potential computations, as if it were executed in parallel 
with other programs. This results in two kinds of actions, according to who performs 
them; either the environment or the program. Then potential computations can be 
classified in terms of the invariant properties their environment (program) actions 
satisfy. Based on this framework we reformulate interference freedom semantically. 
The resulting Hoare logic is similar to [6]. The Hoare triples have the form 
{r, A} p {B, A} where r is, in effect, a set of rely and A a set of guarantee conditions. 
Two such triples can be composed in parallel if the rely conditions of either are 
guarantee conditions of the other. Part of the generality of the system is due to a 
logic of invariants, which we develop. The Hoare system is shown to be sound with 
respect to the semantics and complete relative to Owicki-Gries’s system. 
In Section 1 we shall introduce potential computations and a logic of invariants. 
Section 2 reformulates interference freedom and the semantics of the extended 
Hoare triples {r, A} p {B, A}. The proof system together with a sample proof showing 
that it may be of use for developing programs concludes the paper. 
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1. Potential computations and invariants 
Besides parallel, Owicki-Gries’s programming language contains the await con- 
struct: await B then p, where B is a boolean condition. No interference in its 
execution is permitted: execution only happens when B is true and then the whole 
construct (including the evaluation of B) is executed as an indivisible action. Let 
A be the empty program with its usual properties: r\;p = p = p; A and A lip = p = p/I A. 
The abstract syntax of the programming language where D ranges over appropriate 
booleans is 
p::= A lx:= t Ip;p Iif D then p else p lwhile D do p lawait D then p Ipjjp. 
For simplicity we assume that 11 is a binary operator. No conditions on the atomicity 
of assignment or on programs appearing within the scope of an await are imposed. 
We offer a structured operational semantics for this concurrent language in the 
style of [5] but extended to “potential” computations. Usually, operational models 
understand a program in terms of its execution sequences. But those of pllq are not 
definable from the sequences of p and q. Instead, it has been suggested by [l, 31, 
amongst others, that a program should be thought of as being executed in an 
arbitrary “environment” (that is, in parallel with other programs). This leads to 
understanding a program in terms of its potential computations. 
Assume S is the set of states where a state associates a data value with each 
identifier. Boolean conditions and the first-order formulas of a Hoare logic can be 
interpreted on states in the usual way: let L be the first-order language built from 
terms of the programming language. The notaion +A means: the assertion A is 
true at state s. Moreover, let s[t/x] where t is a data term be the new state which 
is like s except that it associates the value of t in s to the identifier x. A labelled 
transition relation is defined between program state pairs: 
(P, s) -I, (9, 0 
The relation ---+I represents a performance of an indivisible action, a change from 
program p in state s to q in s’. The label 1 indicates the performer: when I= P, it 
is the program; otherwise, the environment acts and I= E. These relations are defined 
as follows. 
Definition 1.1 
(4 -+E: (P, S)+~ (P, s’>; 
(b) - ’ is the least relation such that 
(i) (x:=t, s)+~ (A, s[t/x]), 
(ii) (P; 4, s) -+p (p’;q, s’) if (P, s) +p (P’, s’), 
(iii) (if D then p else q, s) -+p (p, s) if sk=D, 
(iv) (if D then p else q, s) -+P (q, s) if sklD, 
(v) (while D do p, s) -+p (p; while D do p, s) if SK 0, 
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(vi) (while D do p, s) +p (A, s) if s+lD, 
(vii) (await D then p, s) -jp (r\,s’)ifsl=Dandeitherp=~or,forsomensland 
for all i, 1 G i C n, with p. =p; pn = A; so = s and s,, = s’: (pi_, , s,_~) -p (pi, s,), 
(viii) (PII 4, 4 +’ (P’II 9, s’) if (P, s) +’ (P’, s’), 
(ix) (PII 9,s) +’ (p II q’, s’> if (9,s) -+’ (q’, ~7. 
An indivisible program action, according to this definition, is an assignment, an 
await, or an evaluation of a boolean condition. A finer grain of indivisibility as in 
[9,7] could be introduced instead. Notice the sole condition for __tE: (p, s) +E (p, s’) 
represents interference, an updating of the state s to s’ by the environment. We now 
define potential computation. 
Definition 1.2. A potential computation (PC) from p. is any finite or infinite sequence 
of the form: (po, s,,) -+‘o (p, , s,) +‘I . . . where, for each defined i, Ii E { P, E} and 
(PI, si) +‘I (pi+1 Y si+l). 
Two example pcs where p = if x = 0 then p, else p2 and q = await x = 2 then x:=0 
are 
6) (4, s) 2+ (9, sCllx1) : (4, sP/xl) 4 (A, do/xl) 4 (A, do/xl). 
Example (i) illustrates how interference may affect computational behaviour. When 
there are only sequential contexts, x:= 1 ;p can be deemed equivalent to 
x:= 1; if x=0 then p3 else p2. For any p2, p, and p3 cannot contribute to the behaviour 
of these programs in any such context. But not so in the presence of concurrency: 
the environment may make the boolean condition x = 0 true by changing the value 
of x as in example (i). In example (ii) the program q is blocked in the state s[l/x] 
and can only proceed if the environment unblocks it (by making x = 2 true). Both 
(i) and (ii) involve the same sequences of states and at no point do they both 
perform a program action. So they can be conjoined (in the sense of Aczel) to yield 
the following pc from (x:= 1 ;p) II q: 
(iii) (x:=1 ;p II 4,s): (PIIs, s[Ux1)4 (PI/q, Wxl) 
4 (P, s[Olxl) Ji (PI, 4wxl). 
Further conjoinings with (iii) result in pcs from programs with additional parallel 
components. Conversely, any such pc can be divided into component pcs like (i) 
and (ii): each represents a viewpoint of the overall behaviour. The value, therefore, 
of semantics based on pcs is that II can be understood compositionally: pcs from a 
concurrent program are definable in a fixed fashion from those of its components. 
Some notation we shall use in the sequel. Where v is the pc 
~=(Po,so)- ‘O (p,,s,)II‘. . .) 
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then for defined i, u(i) is the ith state s,; r(hi) is the ith label li; and a(k) is the 
ith program pi. We let UpI be the set of all pcs from p. (Using a small number of 
(somewhat messy) sequence operations, the sets [IpI can be defined denotationally). 
Some of the details can be gleaned from the later proofs of Lemma 2.4, and Theorem 
3.1. Finally, an important subset of [Ip] is d[[p] the set of actuaZ computations from 
p: (T is actual if it contains no E labels-so the environment does not contribute 
to the behaviour of u. 
We would like a logical understanding, which we can appeal to when developing 
a Hoare logic, of when pcs represent viewpoints of an overall behaviour. (A much 
richer understanding, using temporal logic, can be found in [3].) To this end we 
introduce a logic of invariants. Actions or events are encapsulated in the operational 
semantics in state changes: a state change is a pair of states (s, s’) both in S where 
s is the state before and s’ the state after the action. Each first-order A E L determines 
a set of changes which are invariant with respect to it. We let Z(A) be this set; Z is 
also extended to families Z of formulas in L. 
Definition 1.3. (i) Z(A) ={(s, s’)lif +A, then s’l=A}. 
(ii) Z(Z) =nAtl. Z(A). 
The idea is that if (s, s’) r? Z(A), then this state change “interferes” with the truth 
of A at s. Each Z(Z) is a subset of S x S. The least subset is {(s, s)}: clearly, a null 
change cannot interfere with the truth of any formula. One representation of this 
set is Z(L). The largest subset is just S x S: representatives of this set include Z(0), 
Z(tt) and Z(ff) where tt is true and ff false. 
We let 3 be an invariant implication between sets of formulas. 
Definition 1.4. T+A iff Z(Z) c Z(A) 
The following lemma provides a characterization of +. Some notation: if Z is a 
set of formulas, then we let 1Z = {lA) A E r} with the convention that 10 = {ff}. 
Moreover, we assume that 
Z%B iff VsES.ifVAEZ,s+A, then s+B. 
Lemma 1.5. r+A z~VBEAVT’C~‘. (Z?Borl(r-r’)i=lB). 
Proof. Suppose T+A. However, for some B E A, r’ G r, not (ZY B) and not 
(l(r-T’)blB). Then there is an s such that VAE r’. .+A and s#B, and an s’ 
such that VA E l(r - r’). s’l=A and s’+lB. Hence, (s’, s) g Z(A). But consider any 
A E ZY If A E r’, then (s’, s) E Z(A). If A sz r’, then also (s’, s) E Z(A) since s’+lA. 
Suppose VB E A VT’s r. (Z% B or l(Z - T’)blB). However, (s, s’) E Z(Z) and 
(s, s’) & Z(A). Then there is a B E A such that s+ B and s’# B. Let Z,, = {C 1 C E Z 
and sl=C}. Then either Z&B or i(Z -I’&=iB. Suppose r&B. Since s’# B, 
there is an A E Z’, such that s’i=A. But then (s, s’) E Z(A), contradicting (s, s’) E Z(Z). 
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Otherwise, l(r -T&=-III. Then, as s+ B, there is an A E I’ - F’, such that +A. But 
this contradicts the definition of I-,. 0 
Some useful consequences of this lemma are the following facts where we write 
1, D for 2 u {II}. 
Fact 1.6. (i) 3 is reflexive and transitive. 
(ii) IfA s I’, then T+A. 
(iii) I~‘F A+-+B and r*A, then r, AaA, B. 
(iv) r, A, B3r, A A B. 
This logic of invariants will play a central role in the Hoare logic of Section 3. 
A pc o involves a sequence of state changes represented by adjacent pairs of 
states, (a(i), o( i + 1)). Hence, pcs may be classified by sets of invariants. However, 
a pc involves two sorts of state change; one is the result of the environment, the 
other the result of a program action. Consequently, a more discriminating 
classification of pcs is in terms of the invariance properties of their environment 
and their program state changes. 
Definition 1.7. (i) E[T] ={a13p. a~l[pl and Vi. if a(hi) = E, then (r(i), cr(i+ 1)) E 
I(r)). 
(ii) p[r]=+(3 . p CTE [pJJ and Vi. if cr(Ai) = P, then (a(i), cr(i+ 1)) E l(r)}. 
So E[T] is the set of pcs with the property that all of its environment changes 
are r invariant. P[T] is similar except for program changes. 
2. Semantics for an extended Hoare triple 
Using pcs and invariants we develop, in this section, semantics of an extended 
Hoare logic for Owicki-Gries’s parallel programming language. First consider the 
meaning of the usual Hoare asserted program {A} p {B} where A, B E L, the first- 
order language interpreted over the state set S. Relative to this interpretation 
{A}p {B} is true (which we write as +{A} p (B}) if whenever A is true of an initial 
state of an actual computation from p, then if the computation terminates, B is then 
true. We recast this in terms of potential and actual computations. Two auxiliary 
notions are expressed in the following definition. 
Definition 2.1. For AE L, 
(i) O[A]={(r13 p. (T E [pl and a(o)bA}; 
(ii) A[A]={a13 _ p v E [[pl and Vj. if a( nj) = A, then 3i < j. o( ri) = A and 
a( i)kA}. 
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The pc (T is an element of OIA] when A holds of its initial state. Count u from 
p as terminating if, for some i, a( rri) = A, in which case p has exhausted its potential 
computational behaviour in (T. So u E A[A] if it fails to terminate or if A is true of 
the initial terminating state, the first si such that a(ni) = A. Therefore, in terms of 
computations (recall that &[[[pj is the set of actual computations from p) we have 
the following definition. 
Definition 2.2. k= {A} p {I?} iff 0[ A] n d[pl G A [ B]. 
The customary difficulties with Definition 2.2 for building Hoare logics for parallel 
programs are twofold. First, there is the presence of &l[pl. Second, there is the 
abstraction from properties of the intermediate states of computations. At the level 
of proof rules, Owicki-Gries’s solution was to observe that a Hoare triple should 
not just be viewed as an independent object but as the conclusion of a proof outline, 
containing intermediate assertions. This extra information is about the intermediate 
states. Two proof outlines can be composed in parallel if they do not interfere with 
each other: the assertions of one including the intermediaries are invariants with 
respect to the subproofs of the indivisible subprograms of the other [9]. Consider 
using pcs to interpret the programs in two such proof outlines. Then interference 
freedom amounts to saying that the environment invariants of one are program 
invariants of the other. We are now going to show this. 
Suppose we replace &[pj with (IpJ in Definition 2.2. The result, as it stands, is 
not very satisfactory because of the unlimited interference to p’s behaviour allowed 
from the environment. A means of controlling the interference is needed. A natural 
suggestion is to include environment assumptions in the Hoare notation, and in 
particular a set of environment invariants. As a first step, we let {r, A} p {B} have 
the meaning 
The set r restricts the changes allowed from the environment. To compose this 
Hoare triple in parallel with another, say (2, C} q {D}, according to Owicki-Gries 
we must know two things: 
(i) that r(Z) “contains” the assertions used in the proof of {A}p {B} 
({Cl 4 {Dl); 
(ii) that each member of T(E) is invariant with respect to the subproofs of the 
indivisible subprograms of q(p). 
In fact, (i) is too detailed: all we need to know is that T+B (2-g). And (ii) 
just means that T(E) is a set of program invariants over the pcs in E[_X] n 0[ C] n [qn 
(E[T] n OIA] n [pjj). This suggests that we must include program invariants in the 
specification. So we introduce the extended Hoare triple {r, A} p {B, A} whose 
meaning is given by the following definition. 
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Definition 2.3. b{r, A} p {i?, A} iff E[T] n O[A] n[pj G A[B] n P[A]. 
The analysis of when two extended Hoare triples can be composed in parallel is 
justified by the next lemma. 
Lemma 2.4. If 
(i) r3 B and k {r, A} p {B, 2 u A}, and 
(ii) 230 and +{JZ:, C} q {D, Tu A}, 
then~{ru~,A~C}pllq{BAD,A}. 
Proof. Suppose (TE E[TuZ]n O[AA C]n[pljqjj. Then 
fl=(P,II%,%)- ‘I3 (PIll91, s,+. . . . 
So (T can be decomposed into (To from p0 and u2 from q,, with the same sequences 
of states. First we show that (T, E E[T] and (TV E E[X]. Suppose not. Then let a;, (r; 
be the maximum prefixes of g1 and c2 which are in E[T] and E[Z]. Suppose the 
lengths of ai, a; are the same. Then 
and 
k; 
u; = (90, %) - * . .A Glntl, &I+,). 
Clearly, then both a,(hn + 1) = a,(An + 1) = E. Hence, a(An + 1) = E. But as (T; is a 
maximal prefix of (TV in E[T], we have (s,+, , s,+J s! I(T) which contradicts UE 
E [r u 21. Otherwise, without loss of generality, suppose the length of ai is greater 
than the length of cri, and suppose a; is as above. Then k;,, = E. Clearly, u:(hn + 
l)=Pforotherwisecr(An+l)=Eandsoa~E[Tu~].But~~~E[T]nO[A]n[[p~ 
and so ai E P[E u A]. But then (s,,, , s,+J E Z(X). And so U; is not the maximal 
prefix of u2 in E[X]. Hence, u1 E E[T] and USE E[2]. 
Now we show u E A [ B A D] n P[A]. Suppose u terminates and its first terminating 
state is c(i). Then both u1 and u2 terminate. Suppose U, terminates before u2. Then 
let ul’s first terminating state be u,(j). Clearly, then u*‘s is UJ i), and j < i. By (i), 
u, (j)b B and all labels beyond j in u1 are E labels. Hence, as r* B and u, E E [ T] 
for all defined j’>j, we have u,(j’)bB. Hence, u,(i)l=B. By (ii), u,(i)+D. So 
a( i)I= B A 0, that is, u E A[ B A D]. The proof is reciprocal if uz terminates before 
u,. Finally, clearly u E P[A] as u, E P[E u A] and (~2 E P[T u A]. 0 
Lemma 2.4 rationalizes Owicki-Gries’s discussion of parallel composition. First, 
note that p and q may themselves be parallel programs: so II can be treated as a 
binary operator like sequential composition. Next, interference freedom can be 
understood semantically, independent of proof outlines and assertions appearing 
therein. At the proof level it means we can offer a syntax-directed Hoare rule for 
parallel. There are further benefits of making explicit features that are implicit in 
Owicki-Gries. Once {r, A} p {B, A} is known, it can be used again in other proofs 
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of parallel programs: the system in [9] lacks this explicit portability. Moreover, the 
extended Hoare triple fits in with the proposal [6] to explicitly include noninterfer- 
ence in program specifications. In fact, the extended triple is very similar to the 
proposal in [6]: r is just a set of rely conditions while A consists of guarantee 
conditions. 
A special case of {I’, A} p {B, A} is when r = L and A = 0. For then it is assumed 
that the environment does not interfere with p, the only environment actions allowed 
do not involve state change; and nothing needs to be known about the invariance 
of the program actions. The meaning of this special case coincides with the usual 
Hoare triple’s meaning as given by Definition 2.2. 
Fact 2.5. k {L, A} p {B, 0) sfs b {A} p { B}. 
Hence, the Hoare triple introduced in Definition 2.3 is an extension of the standard 
triple. 
3. The extended Hoare logic 
The generalization of Owicki-Gries’s Hoare logic below employs the triples 
{I’, A} p {B, A} whose intended meaning was given in the previous section. We 
assume on the basis of Fact 2.5 that {A} p {B} abbreviates {L, A} p {B, 0). Let X be 
a set of variables which appear in p only in assignments x := t with x E X; so, as 
in [9], X is a set of auxiliary variables for p. Then let p\X be the program obtained 
by replacing all assignments of p to variables in X with A and transforming any 
await tt then q into q when q = A or q = y:= f. The rules are as follows. 
A {r, A] * {A, A> 
._ l-JA AkC: VBEA.AAB+B: .- 
{r, A} x:= t {C, A} 
. {~,A~P{B,AI {r, Bl q {c, A> 
3 
Ir, Al p;q {c, A> 
if 
1-*A {r,AADlp{B,Al {r, A A 101 q {B, A> 
{I’, A} if D thenp else q {B, A} 
r*A 
whi1e {r, A} 
{r,AADlp{A,Al 
while D do p {A A TD, A} 
await 
r*A {AADJPIC) VBEA.{AADAB}~{B} 
{I’, A} await D then p {C, A} 
II 
r=x {r,Alp{c,~uAl {ZBlq{E,ruAl Z=3E 
{ru-TA~B~pllq{c~E,A~ 
{Al P {Bl 
AV {AI P\X {Bl 
A, B do not contain free occurrences of x E X 
356 
Con r*r’ 
Al=B {r’, Bl p {C, A’> CkE A’=+A 
{r, Alp (~5 Al 
Included as special cases are the usual Hoare rules for while programs. They are 
obtained by setting r = L and A = 0: for instance, since LJ B for any B E L, A:l=Af 
and A = 0, we can conclude {A:} x:= t {A} from the assignment rule. Notice that, 
as required, each formula in A is invariant with respect to the subproofs of indivisible 
subprograms of a program p: so A is set in the assignment and await rules. The 
parallel rule depends on interlocking of invariants: the environment invariants of 
the one are program invariants of the other proof. This guarantees, as we noted in 
the previous section, (a generalization of) interference freedom in the sense of 
Owicki-Gries. A major disadvantage of both the original Owicki-Gries system and 
its reformulation here is the need for the auxiliary variable rule. For example, it is 
essential to the proof of {x = 0} x:=x+ 1 ]I x:=x+ 1 {x = 2). The consequence rule 
appeals to the two consequence relations + and + defined in Section 1. 
The following theorem shows that the system is sound with respect to the interpre- 
tation of the previous section. Let t{r, A} p {B, A} mean that {r, A} p {B, A} is 
provable in the system above. 
Theorem3.1. Ifk{I’,A}p{B,A}, then k{I’,A}p{B,A}. 
Proof. By induction on the structure of p. We give two sample cases. The central 
case, p = q 11 r is covered by Lemma 2.4. The base cases are p = A and p = x:= t. 
p =~=t. Suppose T=+A, A+ B: and, for all C E A, A A CbCf. Suppose o E 
E[T] n OIA] n [[PD. If (T terminates, then 
u = (p, S”) : . . .2. (p, s,,: (A, sJt/x]$. . . . 
As TJA and (T E E [r] A O[A], we have s,kA. But also sJ= B: since A+ B:. Hence, 
s,[t/x]bB, and UE A[ B]. Moreover, for C E A, if sibA A C, then sil=C: and so 
si[ t/x]l=C. Thus (TE P[A]. If o does not terminate, then it only contains E labels 
and so a~A[B]nP[dl. 
p = q;r. Suppose {r, A} q {B, A} and {r, B} q {C, A}. Consider w E E[T] n 
O[A] n [q;rj. If u terminates, then 
‘0 
a=(q; r, so)-. . . l.2 (4’; r, &) -5 (Y, s;+,) A . . . 
‘-‘(~‘,S~+,)~(A,S~+~)Z.... 
Clearly, we can extract the pcs ml, (T* with u, from q and u2 from r: 
‘” 
fll = (4, &I) - . . -k(q’,S;)‘(A,Si+l)r 
I 
“’ a,=(r, .s,+~)L ’ . .- (r’, s,+J 4 (A, %+2). 
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Thena,EA[B]nP[A]sincea,EE[T]nO[A]n[[qn.Andu,EA[C]nP[A]since 
+E E[T]n O[B]n[rJ. So (TE A[D]n P[A]. The case for nonterminating (T is 
similar. 0 
The system is complete relative to Owicki-Gries’s system (which is Cook complete 
[2,8]). Forgetting the different styles of systems, Owicki-Gries’s system is (barring 
one or two inessentials) the subsystem where TJA is understood as A E r. Let 
It-(A) p {B} mean {A} p {B} is provable in Owicki-Gries’s system. 
Theorem 3.2. If IF {A} p {I?}, then k {A} p {B}. 
Proof. The result follows almost trivially from Owicki’s preassertion function, pre, 
(cf. [8]; see also [2]) and the characterization of interference freedom in Section 2. 
For from pre we get 
IF(A) p IB] implies k{pre(p) u r, A] p {B, 0>, 
and interference freedom gives the statement: If It {A} p {B} and IF{ C} q {II} are 
interference-free, then 
t{pdp) u {W, Al P (4 we(q) u IDI) and 
kipre(s) u {Dl, Cl 4 (0, pre(p) u {WI. 
A pertinent criticism of Owicki-Gries’s system is its unsuitability for program 
development. In contrast, the generalization offered here does allow for development 
in the spirit of [6]. We illustrate this with an example, a generalization of Owicki- 
Gries’s array searching algorithm (cf. [9]) with which it should be compared. The 
two features that aid development are the inclusion of noninterference conditions 
in the specification and the logic of invariants. 
Example 3.3. Let a[i], 1 d i G m be an array. Find the least member, if there is one, 
satisfying the predicate P (where P does not mention a). Let this member be x, 
otherwise, if there is not one, let x = m + 1. So we want a program FINDP such 
that {tt} FINDP {A}, where 
We expect FINDP to be of the form: 1NIT;SEARCH where INIT initializes and 
SEARCH searches. In SEARCH we use a number of concurrent programs, say 
rG m: for simplicity let r divide m. Call each one SEARCH(j), 1 < jc r. Each 
SEARCH(j) scans the array squares j, n +j, 2n + j, . . . , m + j looking for x. So assume 
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each SEARCH(j) has a “private” variable xj for searching. We want termination 
of SEARCH(j) to occur when 
(i) fYa[x-l) or 
(ii) xj > m or 
(iii) SEARCH(k) has found that P(a[xk]) for xk < xj. 
So we introduce a further “private” variable yj for each SEARCH(j) which initially 
is set to m +j and if P( a[xj]) holds, then yj is reduced to xj. Hence, the termination 
condition for SEARCH(j) is xj 2 min{yl, . . . , yr}. Finally, x will be the value of 
min(y1,. . . , yr} when each SEARCH(j) terminates. 
The idea of the formalism {r, A} p {B, A} is that we develop p subject to the 
assumptions r about the environment and assumptions A we make about p. Consider 
SEARCH(j); then, 
(i) as xj, yj are “private”, the environment cannot affect their values or increase 
yk, k #j 
(ii) the program SEARCH(j) cannot affect the variables xn and yn (for n f j) 
and it does not increase the initial value of yj. 
Thus the environment and program assumptions for SEARCH(j) are given by the 
sets: 
u {yj = i 11 G is m + r}, 
A, = u {yn = i 11 <iGm+r}u IJ {xn=iIl~i~m+r} 
n+j n#j 
u {yj < i 11 S i G m + r}. 
SEARCH(j) will be a loop with invariant cj (compare A): 
l A,=x,modr=jAVk. 1. <k~xjkmodr=j+lP(a[k]); 
l Bj=yj<m+P(a[yj])AyjGm+j; 
l Cj=A.,~ B,. 
So SEARCH(j) is 
while xj < min{y 1, . . . , yr} do 
if P( a[xj]) then yj := xj 
else xj := xj + r 
Then {rj, C,} SEARCH(j) {C, A xj 2 min{yl, . . . , yr}, Aj} follows from 
(a) {Lj,xj<yjr\ C,A P(a[xj])} yj:=xj {Cj, A,}, 
(b) {c,xj<yjAC,r\l--P(u[xj])} xj:=xj+r {C,,Aj}. 
And (a) depends on 
rj =3 xj<yj~C,~P(u[xj]); 
(b) depends on 
5 =3 xj< yj A C, A iP(u[xj]). 
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Application of the if rule depends on rj+xj < yj A C, and, finally, applying the 
while rule depends on r+Cj. 
SEARCH is the program SEARCH(l) /I. . . 11 SEARCH(r). By repeated applica- 
tion of the parallel rule (where A = A ,s-irsr) we find 
{U rj, A Ci} SEARCH {AC, A Axi 3 min{yl,. . . , yr}, 0). 
So, by the Con rule, as LJU ri, 
{// C,} SEARCH {A C, A /“\ xi 2 min{yl, . , . , yr}}. 
Then x is set to min{yl, . . . , yr}. Note that 
A C,Axi2min{y1 ,..., yr}+A&{yl,..., yr}. 
And INIT is xj := j ; yj := m + j for 1 s i S r. So, finally, 
{tt} INIT ; SEARCH ; x := min(y1,. . . , yr} {A}. 
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